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In her endorsement of Glitch Feminism: A Manifesto, cul-
ture andmedia theorist McKenzieWark locates its author
Legacy Russell among those who are ‘playing in the ru-
ins’ of ‘the old empire of imperatives about both flesh
and tech’. The book, she seems to warn, will walk you
through the walls of an established theoretical tradition,
all the while casting shade on its crumbling masonry.
And yet, while Russell’s prose is as determined as
any good manifesto’s in containing the force of rupture
its existence must imply, and while an entire chapter
is committed to the glitch ‘throwing shade’, any taking-
down of predecessors is minimal and gracious. Russell
saves her word count for better things: for celebrations
of radical art and injunctions to political creativity. But
to adequately affirm her success in this project – which
offers an alternative to decades of tortured Theory – I
feel I must recall some of the empire of problems amidst
which the book was born.
Like most who have located their intellectual innova-
tions within a history of cyberfeminism (the site of many
an imperative on flesh and tech both), Russell acknow-
ledges early in her book an important, if ambivalent, rela-
tionship to the thought of Donna Haraway. Glitch Femin-
ism mines internet-based artistic practice in arguing for
the online space as a liberatory site of experimentation
in ‘glitching’, or subverting, the binarily gendered body.
Haraway, of course, remains best known for her ‘Cyborg
Manifesto’, an essay that in 1985 responded to what the
author had been tasked with identifying as the Reagan-
era’s central challenges to socialist feminist politics. Her
manifesto was a call to leftist feminists to reimagine
themselves as political subjects by imaginatively recon-
ceiving the boundaries of their bodies. As Russell phrases
it in a reframing of de Beauvoir’s old adage: ‘One is not
born, but rather becomes a body’.
Haraway, observing how immiseration was being
wrought differentially among feminised agents by the
globalisation and de-industrialisation of capital, pro-
posed that resistance to these new forms of damage de-
manded a new kind of political identity. Neither ‘woman’
nor ‘proletarian’, in her view, was adequate to capturing
the complex and complexifying affinities of queer women
or women of colour, not least those assembling computer
chips in East Asia. Conjuring the image of the cyborg as
imaginative aid, Haraway asked her readers to recognise
all living organisms as necessarily hybrid, enveloping
and smudging falsely circumscribed identities, just as
the cyborg – both human and machine – necessarily dis-
solves the definitive boundaries of the ‘natural’ and the
‘synthetic’. Hers was a vision of multiplicity and infinite
permutation across the spectrum of the feminised and
within each feminised subject, giving political agents an
appreciation of difference around which, paradoxically,
they might be better placed to collectivise.
The advent of the internet, however, invigorated
among feminist artists, coders, gamers and writers in-
spired by Haraway a more literal idea of the political
subject as both organism and machine. Cyberfemin-
ism, a school of both theory and praxis, unified itself in
1997 when 38 of its proponents convene at Documenta
X. While the shared manifesto they produced betrayed
varying notions of cyberfeminism’s definition, all sought
to emphasise the necessary role of internet technology
in feminist revolution. It was clear that information and
communication technologies were not only developing
in the mould of the human nervous system, but were also
themselves effecting the kinds of alteration in the hu-
man field of perception that gave the figure of the cyborg
vivid new meaning.
In redefining the cyborg simply as she who operates
online, most cyberfeminisms of the ’90s and early 2000s
had effectively dispensed with Haraway’s concern to sus-
tain an account of difference, allowing the vision of eman-
cipatory ends pinned on techno-optimism to license its
divisive means. As cyberfeminist artist Faith Wilding
pointed out, the net was ‘not a utopia of nongender’, but
rather an entity ‘already socially inscribed with regard to
bodies, sex, age, economics, social class and race’. And
as Russell adds, summarising cyberfeminism’s histor-
ical limitations, ‘white women = producing white theory
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= producing white cyberspace’. Even as artists such as
Wilding began to range further than the net, confronting
other technological frontiers of feminist practice (not-
ably that of biotechnology), the problem of reconciling
difference with a unified feminist project endured. In
2021 it feels almost platitudinous to state that the absorp-
tion of ‘technology’ in untrammelled techno-capitalism
has enhanced the latter’s potential to redouble divisions
between women along the lines of employment status
and labour conditions. As technologies of exploitation
flourish at a quickening pace, the degradation of some
women’s labour collidesmore horribly than that of others
with the exploitation of their race, sexuality and class.
The practice of ‘embracing technology’ has never uni-
formly enthused the left. In 2015, Laboria Cuboniks’Xen-
ofeminist Manifesto (XFM), which positioned its techno-
accelerationist vision as ‘the only true suspension of in-
equality’, was lauded by many – not least among them
Mark Fisher – for aspiring to break through the kind of
unambitious melancholia that had stalled the turn of
the millennium’s cyberfeminist zeal. ‘[T]he machines
are so alive’, wrote Haraway, ‘whereas the humans are so
inert!’, and in that sense XFM seemed to kick against the
posture of leftist listlessness that redefines the ‘Luddite’
in the present. Its rhetoric scorned those who allowed
essentialised, oppressed identities to limit the horizon
of leftist struggle to ‘survival’ (rather than transforma-
tion). And yet, as Annie Goh has argued, XFM’s explicitly
‘rationalist’ project of universalised feminism makes no
new intervention to mitigate the costs of its hyperactive
approach to those whom techno-capital most exploits.
Indeed, what of those on the left to whom there remains
no choice but to prioritise survival?
Russell opens her set of artist-led meditations by ref-
erencing E. Jane, who she affirms is not being hyberbolic
in asserting, as ‘a Black artist with multiple selves’, that
‘we are dying at a rapid pace’. ‘Pushed to the margins’,
Russell agrees, ‘we find ourselves as queer people, as
people of colour, as femme-identifying people most vul-
nerable in weathering world conditions, ranging from
climate change to plantation capitalism’. But while she
is for this reason unable to gloss over the ways in which
cybertechnologies serve to accelerate violent ‘world con-
ditions’, her response is far from technophobic. As Rus-
sell sees it, for the specific ‘we’ that crests an intersection
of gender and racial oppression, facing down architec-
tures of power requires, as an urgent prerequisite, finding
‘techniques that provide space for ourselves’ to do so. If
reality happens (and power lies) online as well as ‘away
from the keyboard’ (AFK), some of these spaces of cover
and resistance will inevitably rest in cyberspace. The
question of engaging with the online world while sus-
taining a critique of power thus becomes the motivating
force behind Russell’s signal concept.
Enter ‘Glitch Feminism’, an idea Russell conceived
in 2012 that in the intervening years has blossomed with
artists’ use of it as creative material. Where Lucca Fraser
of Laboria Cuboniks brashly insists that ‘Yes’, the mas-
ter’s tools can dismantle the master’s house, Russell of-
fers the more sophisticated suggestion that what institu-
tions of power requiremay be not somuch dismantling as
‘strategic occupation’. Beginning with an understanding
of gender as a disciplinary technology – a core cog within
capitalist society’s wheel, and the body as a weapon of
that technology – giving form to ‘an idea that has no
form’, Russell proposes the glitch as a means of taking
that form and, through rupture, rendering it abstract
oncemore. The technological glitch–a formof ‘machinic
anxiety’ – serves in this sense as a portal of imagination,
suggesting applications of error and strategic nonper-
formance in cyberspace to the violently normative world
in which lives are lived AFK.
Recognising, as Foucault did, that power can be both
restrictive (potestas) and productive (potentia), Russell
targets the internet as a central site of both types, look-
ing to the productive force of artistic representation
online as the basis of art’s more general potentia to of-
fer modes of refusal. Summoning to her argument a
panoply of philosophical men (Édouard Glissant, Gil-
bert Ryle, Timothy Morton, Henri Lefebvre, Jean-Luc
Nancy…), Russell’s theory of parts and wholes brings to
their incomplete theories an alternative framework for
imagining autonomous political participation in ‘real-
ity’. This framework is formed both by and for queer
and female-identifying women of colour, and plots the
sphere of agency as occurring dynamically both on and
away from the keyboard.
Mobilising her own experiences of self-formation
through artmaking, nightlife and internet living, Rus-
sell’s emancipatory vision is animated by the work of
an eclectic chorus of contemporary artists. As Deleuze,
inspired by the Surrealists, saw in art the potential
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for advancing a relationship with technology radically
detached from functionalism and organised efficiency,
a process of becoming ‘bodies without organs’, these
artists engage in the digital remix of what Russell calls
‘corpo-realities’, reforming these in opposition to techno-
capital’s rabid opportunism. Stretching the body’s res-
onance to cosmic registers, these artists draw on the
peculiar potential in the aesthetic to create new ways
of imagining what the body can do beyond our calcified
norms.
In the glittering land of the glitch, artist and drag
queen Victoria Sin exposes the seams of gender-prep
through hyperbolic re-performance both online and off,
showcasing cracks in ‘the gloss and gleam of capitalist
consumption of gender as product’; Sondra Perry uses
3D graphics to highlight encrypted signifiers of lost Black
traumas, manipulating technology’s rhythms of repres-
sion and surveillance; Shawné Michaelain Holloway’s
‘cam girl’ adventures tug at the lines between vulner-
able selves and impenetrable digital skins; American
Artist poses a challenge to search engine coloniality; and
POWRPLANT attempts to trailblaze dissolution and re-
distribution in digital education. Through each artistic
exposition, Russell demonstrates that digital activity can
neither be unlinked from the world of AFK, nor dismissed
as somehow ‘immaterial’. Her frames of reference for il-
lustrating this range from Zach Blas’s ‘collective masks’,
which effectively undermine the requirements of biomet-
ric data gathering, to Simone C. Niquille’s digital avatar
modelling, which intervenes in the forensic ambitions
constructed by the defence in the trial of George Zimmer-
man.
Such feats of critical artmaking are of course far from
devoid of their own internal scepticisms. Holloway’s
‘fantasy-fetish’ underscores, as Russell puts it, ‘the im-
plausibility of ever being able to fully dictate or refuse
how one’s body can and cannot be digested through a
digital platform’. Among theorists of contemporary bi-
opower, progressively accustomed to the problem of res-
istance fromwithin the neoliberal frame, there emerges a
growing consensus that the absorption of the psychic self
in a power apparatus that encourages auto-oppression
obviates any possibility of resistance on the level of cor-
poreal gesture. The subject, immersed in the institu-
tional apparatus that seeks to subject them,nowbecomes
indistinguishable from the institution itself. Russell is
not blind to the truth in this negative corpo-reality.
What Glitch Feminism offers, however, is a commit-
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ment to exploring where channels of resistance might
still be forced open. While it is central to Russell’s ar-
gument that, the machine being ‘the material through
which we process our bodily experience’, bodies are ‘as
much computational as they are flesh’, she refuses to ac-
cept this as cause for surrender to certain malign strains
of computational power. ‘We are standing inside the
machine’, she writes, and every day we make a choice
whether or not to rob ourselves’. Similarly, while acknow-
ledging that it becomes difficult to see the artificiality of
gender when submergedwithin its omnipresent and over-
whelming logic, Russell sustains an account of gender
as not only as a tired fantasy, but one whose relinquish-
ment will amount to an escape from manifold modes of
regulation, management, division of labour, exchange of
value and control.
Glitch Feminism, while an invocation of the ‘cosmic’,
is all about ‘finding one’s range’. As such, it is vitally
aware of its own boundaries and limitations. Neither a
blueprint for overthrowing global capitalism, nor a set
of infrastructure-level demands (in the vein of the Cy-
borg Manifesto’s call for the unionisation of office work-
ers), it rather renews the serious call for new forms of
subjectivity that white cyberfeminisms dropped. This
is not an alternative to proposing new forms of (secure,
de-centralised) digital infrastructure, but rather a pre-
requisite for such projects. Proceeding from the self-
constructive power of her earliest chatroom handle, Rus-
sell’s interest is in nascent performances of selves – ges-
tures of digital self-determination – as necessary forms
of world-building. Through her text she enters, like the
early-twentieth-century artist of Saidiya Hartman’sWay-
ward Lives, Beautiful Experiments (2019), ‘the intensity of
creating and inhabiting a world with others, a domain of
collective bodies, kinaesthetic experience and gestural
language’.
In the process of becoming political subjects who en-
act the requisite ‘failure to function within the confines
of a society that fails us’, the glitched bring into being
the kinds of subjectivity that are necessary conditions of
the largest anti-capitalist visions –moves towards trans-
forming partially shared agendas such that political unity
on the left might one day be more than fantasy or lie.
While a latter-day Haraway, to the disappointment of her
followers, ultimately draws from intersectionality only
a deepening sense of cyclical, inescapable domination,
Russell holds liberation on her horizon. Her achievement
amounts to what Toni Cade Bambara once affirmed as
the very ‘task of the artist’: if the task is determined by
the status and process and agenda of the community that
[the artist] already serves’, the task for the artist whose
community’s survival depends upon political change is
‘to make the revolution irresistible’.
Amber Husain
All that Hegel allows
Robert Pippin, Filmed Thought: Cinema as Reflective Form (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019). 312pp., £79.00 hb.,
£28.00 pb., 978 022667 1 956 hb., 978 022667 2 007 pb.
The course of the relationship between philosophy and
film studies never did run smooth. The encounter of
these two disciplines, while producing both influential
and exciting work, has often been beset by mistrust and
misapprehension, ruptures, rejections and partings of
ways. For all the promising developments made by the
likes of Gilles Deleuze, Alexander Kluge, Miriam Hansen,
and others, mutual mistrust remains. In recent years,
much of the work attempting to rekindle this interdiscip-
linary flame has been markedly political, with thinkers
like Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou and, perhaps most
visibly, Slavoj Žižek, exploring cinema as a path to ideo-
logical critique: reflecting on the social relations of the
present and the modes of being which arise from them.
Beyond his extensive work on Hegel, Nietzsche and
the problem of modernity, cinema has remained one
of the focal points of Robert Pippin’s critical attention
across the last decade, during which time he has created
a body of work that engages with the possibility of sta-
ging a productive encounter between the two disciplines
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